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ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the use of strategy, structure and professionalization to improve the long-term 
competitiveness of sport organizations. The case study contemplates two of the top ten Brazilian 
football clubs using qualitative data from 21 interviews with their upper management, and a 
documentary research of secondary data. The results indicate that similar structural changes and 
professionalization processes have different implications for the clubs, with distinct contributions to 
their growth and competitiveness. The research presents evidence that both the formulation of the 
strategy and the way it is implemented are determinant in conciliating sports and financial objectives 
with the responses to internal and external contingencies, implementing organizational changes to 
benefit the performance of the club on-field and off-field.
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INTRODUCTION
The strategic management of football clubs in Brazil has become as challenging as winning football championships. The achievement of sustainable competitiveness increasingly relies on clubs’ organizational restructuring and professionalization, as much as team 
building and skilled players are key to superior performance on the field. Between 2003 and 2014, 
the revenue of the 20 biggest Brazilian teams grew 388% (SILVA, 2016; SOMOGGI, 2015) and 
despite this growth, their total debt increased 530% during the same period, reaching BRL 6.2 
billion, the equivalent to two years of their total revenue.  Moreover, the combined loss of these 
clubs corresponded to 19% of their 2014 total income (SILVA, 2015; SOMOGGI, 2015). Strategy, 
according to Chandler, is “the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying 
out these goals” (CHANDLER, 1962, p.15-16). When confronting the past decade’s financial 
performance of football clubs with this early definition of strategy, we may infer that their general 
managers rather choose to deal with the following season’s championship sportive priorities, no 
matter the cost. In fact, Brazilian football clubs are nonprofit legal entities and their main objective 
is analogous to that of most European football clubs: the maximization of playing success instead 
of profits (GARCIA-del-BARRIO; SZYMANSKI, 2009; SLOANE, 2015). However, in Europe 
the clubs are subject to a break-even constraint (MORROW, 2014), which is not the case in Brazil 
yet. Apart from the risk of insolvency, the collateral effect of this practice is that these 20 clubs have 
a renegotiated tax liability of BRL 2.1 billion in 2014, 34% of their total debts.
Notwithstanding the importance of the football industry in Brazil, local scholars have paid 
little attention to empirical research about strategic choice to match environmental circumstances 
to the organization and competitiveness of football clubs. The first decade of the 21st century was 
marked by a debate in relation to the clubs poor sportive and financial performance (VALENTE; 
SERAFIM, 2006; ZOUAIN; ALVES; PIERANTI, 2006), new laws that imposed restrictions 
regarding football players’ registration (SOUZA; ANGELO, 2005), as well as the need of 
management professionalization (AZEVEDO; REBELLO, 2002; LEONCINI; SILVA, 2005). As 
a corollary of such debate, researchers turned their attention to the impacts and opportunities of 
football commercialism (GONÇALVES; CARVALHO, 2006) and globalization (RIBEIRO, 2007), 
the emergence of sport marketing (AREIAS, 2007; ALBINO et al., 2009) as well as the need of 
business-like management of clubs (AIDAR; LEONCINI, 2002; GONÇALVES; SILVA, 2007; 
RODRIGUES; SILVA, 2009).
The past five years, a period when the financial situation of the majority of football clubs 
got worse, has provided a context in which studies were conducted about their financial efficiency 
(NASCIMENTO et al., 2015). To a certain extent, the local scholar debate during this period 
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reflected similar concerns to those from the international academy about football. The arrival of 
the new century has brought new opportunities and challenges for football clubs as a global sport, 
leading academic approaches to study football as a business (HAMIL; MICHIE; OUGHTON, 1999; 
SLOANE, 2015) that required a particular strategy (GRUNDY, 2004, SHILBURY; FERKINS, 
2011), the development of an international marketing approach (DESBORDES, 2007; RATTEN, 
2016), accountability and corporate governance (DIMITROPOULOS, 2014; RADIC, 2014), as 
well as a regulatory review (MORROW,  2014).
The purpose of this study is to investigate two of the top ten Brazilian clubs, Cruzeiro 
Esporte Clube and Sport Club Internacional, to determine their responses to internal and external 
contingencies in regards to organizational, sportive and financial performance, between 2003 and 
2012. This paper demonstrates the impact of the changing football environment on these clubs’ 
management practice and, more specifically, how strategy, the club’s structure and professionalization 
were used to improve overall long-term competitiveness, on-field and off-field.
LITERATURE REVIEW
STRATEGY AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The football clubs in Brazil do not count neither with academic approaches nor with local 
successful benchmarks as models on how to overcome their financial crisis and achieve superior 
long-term performance. Even though foreign successful team cases (GERRARD, 2005) or the 
analysis of international football teams/leagues (GARCIA-del-BARRIO; SZYMANSKI, 2009) 
may be useful references to assess local clubs’ strategy and professionalization practices, their 
contribution might be limited due to relevant asymmetries between local and foreign markets. 
Therefore, our option in this empirical study is to draw on traditional works on strategic management 
research to look for insights that might help its investigation.
The strategy of a firm aligns its strengths and weaknesses to environmental opportunities and 
threats, under changing circumstances, to achieve superior and sustainable performance (PORTER, 
1991). While many studies about the sources of sustained competitive advantage focused their 
attention on the analysis of environmental conditions that may favor superior performance 
(PORTER, 1980, 1991), others examine the firms’ resources and their link with sustained competitive 
advantage (WERNERFELT, 1984; BARNEY, 1991). A competitive advantage exists when the firm 
implements a value creating strategy, which differs from those developed by its competitors; it is 
a sustained competitive advantage, even if not lasting forever, when the competitors are unable to 
duplicate the benefits of this strategy (BARNEY, 1991). The concept of value chain introduced by 
Porter (1991) refers to the firm’s potential resource-based advantages. The resource-based view of 
the firm approach developed by Barney (1991) advances the value chain logic further and proposes 
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which are the attributes of isolated value chain resources that make them sources of sustained 
competitive advantage: they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable 
(BARNEY, 1995). The author states that to realize the firm’s competitive advantage potential, the 
firm must be organized to fully use and benefit from its resources and capabilities. Even though the 
various components of a firm’s organization have a limited ability to generate superior performance 
in isolation, when combined with other firm’s resources and capabilities they can enable it to 
achieve its full competitive advantage (BARNEY, 1995).
Barney’s approach corroborates Chandler (1962)’s statement that organizational structure 
follows strategy, meaning that different matches between strategy and structure have different effects 
on a firm’s performance. However, the growing interest in competitive outcomes of organizational 
development have leaded some scholars to study the processes of strategy implementation 
separately from the firm’s content of strategy or from its competitive context, which is inappropriate 
according to the developments of resource-based view suggestions (BARNEY, 1995). Another call 
to strategy academics and practitioners worth mentioning is the one from Whittington (1996) to 
the approach focused on strategy as a social “practice”, on how strategists really interact. The 
“practice” approach is based on insights from the processes that allow organizations to acknowledge 
the need for strategic change and how to achieve it, but it is concerned with how the practitioners 
at the management level “strategize”. Instead of being concerned with the core competences 
of the organization, the practice perspective is concerned with the practical competence of the 
manager as a strategist (WHITTINGTON, 1996). In a parallel work, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and 
Lampel (2005) reviewed the vast literature of strategic management and identified ten “schools” of 
thought regarding the strategy-formation process. Each one of them views strategy from a different 
managerial perspective of strategy formation process. To maintain the study’s focus, the article 
draws on some insights provided by the entrepreneurial and the configuration approaches. The 
Entrepreneurial School focuses on the person who leads the organization. It is concerned with the 
leader’s vision rather than their team’s perceptions, with his/her intuition and mental vision about 
the future path that the organization should follow. The entrepreneurial strategy has paternalistic 
traits, centralizes authority and transforms the leader into an individual with “superpowers”. The 
Configuration School, distinctively, pays attention to the different strategy/structure patterns that 
allow the organization to evolve from stability periods to stages of transformation leading to a new 
configuration of its structure in search of a fit to the changing environment.
STRUCTURE
Donaldson (1999) states that the classical theory concentrates the first essays and works about 
organizational structure, based on the search for the best way to organize a firm. He highlights the 
BBR, Braz. Bus. Rev. (Engl. ed., Online),
Vitória, BBR Special Issue, p. 67-93, 2017
www.bbronline.com.br
Management is not a Game: The Effects of Strategy and Structural Changes
in the Competitiveness of Football Clubs71
incorporation of changes in organizational structures by hierarchical decentralization and work 
abstraction. Chandler (1962) contributes to these studies by stating that the structure is not just a 
choice of a more efficient option, but a sketch, i.e., a configuration of resources and internal processes 
related to factors surrounding the organization and the goals set by the organizational strategy. The 
author develops his argument by defining the structure as reactive. Through the projected strategy, 
problems and internal obstacles take place and affect the organizational performance. Therefore, 
it is necessary to adopt an appropriate structure to regain performance. Although structural factors 
influence decision-making, Chandler (1962) states that the structure is contingent to the expansion 
and growth strategy established by the top management. The contingency theories (CHANDLER, 
1962; LAWRENCE; LORSCH, 1967) study the organization behavior based on the idea that either 
the intra-organizational context or the environment puts pressure on the organization and requires 
its structure to adapt in the long run. The notion of contingency adjustment to structure is based on 
the idea that a misfit of structure and contingency leads to low performance that creates pressure 
for change to recover structure-contingency fit (DONALDSON, 1999).  For the purposes of this 
article, a standard organization structure has five parts: 1) the strategic apex consists of the upper 
management and its personal staff; 2) the middle line comprises the managers responsible for the 
operations; 3) the operating core includes all employees in charge of the club’s services; 4) the 
technostructure “consists of those analysts, out of the formal ‘line’ structure, who apply analytic 
techniques to the design and maintenance of the structure and to the adaptation of the organization 
to its environment”; 5) the support staff provides indirect support to the various organizational 
teams - legal counsel, public relations, quality auditing, etc. (MINTZBERG, 1995, p. 323).
PROFESSIONALIZATION
The term professionalization refers to organizational changes introduced in football clubs 
to implement a more business-like approach to its management and operations. Applying the 
concept of Shilbury and Ferkins (2011, p.108) to the football industry, professionalization means 
the “transition from an amateur, volunteer-driven pastime to a more business-like sector”. It has to 
do with:
[…] “the change experienced as a result of the influx of full-time, managerial business-
like professionals into what have been traditionally volunteer-run organizations… 
Changes in this regard are caused by, and are the product of, professionals entering sport 
organizations who introduce new managerial practices, decision-making processes, pro-
grams and/or policies.” (DOWLING et al., 2014, p.522).
The goal of this study is to investigate its influence on clubs management and the way they 
strategize the development of their organizations. How do strategy, structure and professionalization 
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contribute to improving the long-term competitiveness of football clubs? The empirical research on 
this question will help to understand the actual implications of internal resources and capabilities 
development and to which extent they may help clubs to benefit from market opportunities and 
constraints.
METHODS
This study adopts a qualitative research method of exploratory and descriptive character 
implemented through case studies. The professionalization of football clubs’ management in 
Brazil is a relatively recent phenomenon with scarce empirical research. Therefore, the qualitative 
approach is well suited because it allows the researcher to explore in depth the complex relationships 
and facts involved in a particular case (FLICK, 2004). It uses the descriptive method due to its 
flexibility and integration with the phenomenon under analysis, giving the researcher greater 
freedom throughout the study’s development and in the analysis of the variables involved in the 
case. According to Yin (2001), it also considers a greater number of evidence than other research in 
strategies do, preserving the characteristics and specificities of a particular event, analyzed within 
its own context.
In March 26, 2001, the article of the Pelé Law that abolished the limitation of player’s 
mobility became effective and raised a concern about unbalanced competitiveness among clubs 
(SOUZA; ANGELO, 2005). In 2001, Cruzeiro ended the Brazilian football championship in the 21st 
position. In the following year, 2002, it was Internacional’s turn to finish the championship in the 
20th position. Both clubs, at the end of those two seasons, were few positions above relegation to the 
“B” division of Brazilian football. The study covers the ten-year period between 2003 and 2012, and 
captures the changes introduced by the abolition of the transfer system, as well as other structural 
modifications in the football market. To triangulate the data collected through interviews, a primary 
and secondary documental research used books, documents, collections, magazines, newspapers, 
editorials and audited financial statements directly from the clubs. Afterwards, presidents and vice 
presidents, directors and superintendents answered research questions during 21 interviews, with 
their consent to record the conversations. At Cruzeiro, nine out of ten 10 respondents occupied 
these positions. The content analysis followed the model of Bardin (2002) due to its qualitative 
nature. At Internacional, nine out of eleven respondents had formal positions in the strategic apex 
and middle line.
DATA ANALYSIS
Cruzeiro and Internacional have similarities that favor a direct comparison of their 
performances. Both clubs have an equivalent size of fan bases, Cruzeiro with 6.2 million supporters, 
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while Internacional has 5.6 million (LANCE-IBOPE, 2014). In 2002, their annual revenues were 
BRL 41.7 million and BRL 24.0 million, respectively. Their option towards professionalization 
was motivated by sportive challenges, changes to the Pelé Law and market opportunities.
The paper starts the data analysis presenting the strategy from each club and its long-term 
financial implications. It follows with the structural changes implemented by both clubs, its 
similarities and differences. The organizational context at Cruzeiro and Internacional describes the 
circumstances that affected their presidents’ choices. Next, it summarizes the professionalization 
processes and strategy practices of each club. Then, it proceeds to examine the implications of 
strategy, structure and professionalization on the clubs’ sport and financial performances, comparing 
them with each other and with the market.
STRATEGY
The changes of the football industry in the early 2000’s reduced the dependency of clubs 
on ticket sales by generating new sources of revenues.  Besides the attendance at the stadium, the 
match day produced an increasing flow of revenues through the broadcasting rights. The brand-
related businesses such as sponsorship, the club’s image rights, merchandising and licensing 
became the focus to increase revenues. The globalization of the sport expanded players’ negotiation 
with foreign clubs.
Figure 1 shows the growth of revenues of the 20 biggest Brazilian clubs between 2003 and 
2012 (SOMOGGI, 2015), which attained a 378% increase, a trend that was followed in different 
ways by Cruzeiro (+130%) and Internacional, (+959%). By 2012, the 20 biggest clubs had a total 
revenue of BRL 3.2 billion, Cruzeiro with BRL 120.4 million (13th position), and Internacional 
with BRL 252.9 million (3rd position).
The interview with Cruzeiro’s top managers revealed that its strategy was clearly designed 
around the football season, which was the most important change related to the club’s strategy 
during this period. Its practice was to formalize short-term plans in other areas of the club that 
clearly acted as a support to football and were compelled to change plans in a short time.
At Internacional, the most significant reported changes were, first, the institutionalization of 
the club’s strategy through the formalization of short and long-term plans, integrating its political 
and executive spheres to minimize the effects of political transitions upon the club’s management. 
Due to the political diversity of its Deliberative Council (DC) and the biennial mandates, the club’s 
directors feared that management periodical changes would jeopardize the progress of the club. To 
avoid it, Internacional adopted the practice of long-term strategic planning and implemented it with 
the collaboration of representatives of all levels and political movements. The DC had to approve 
the strategic planning to legitimize it during any given period, regardless of the political movement 
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Source: Cruzeiro and Internacional annual reports; Somoggi (2015).
Figure 1. Evolution of football clubs revenues, 2003-2012.
in charge of the club. Second, the club’s strategy counted on the participation of employees and 
managers from all areas of the club in the planning formulation and implementation, reducing 
centralization from its leaders. This procedure facilitated the engagement of the club’s staff around 
the adopted strategy and gave vice-presidencies greater long-term projects autonomy.
The analysis of each club’s strategy in response to the early 2000’s changing environment 
suggests that Cruzeiro’s goal was to improve its positioning through playing performance, following 
the priorities of each season. Due to the Brazilian industry profile, the club’s conduct in face of 
strong competitors was to try maximizing playing success in search of differentiation, a behavior in 
accordance with the positioning approach from Porter (1980). Internacional seems to have reacted 
to the options and constraints imposed by the market by looking to improve the core competencies 
of its entire organization. Its engagement in the club’s strategy formulation and implementation is in 
line with the approach proposed by Whittington (1996), showing a concern with the improvement 
of the practical competence of managers as strategists, which has empowered the organization in 
regards to the prior political prominence.
The football clubs are influenced by the pursuit of a virtuous circle. Sporting success increases 
revenues allowing the club to spend more with talented players to achieve further sporting success 
(GERRARD, 2005). The analysis of revenues from Cruzeiro and Internacional suggest that their 
marketing departments followed different paths.
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Figure 2 shows the evolution of Cruzeiro’s sources of revenues. From 2005 to 2012, the 
player transfers income was reduced from BRL 56.7 million to BRL 23.6 million. This indicates a 
move from the players market (62% of the total income in 2005) to the consumers market (stadium-
based, broadcasting and commercial revenues), which has increased its share from 38% (2005) to 
80% (2012). Broadcasting revenue was the main responsible for such a change, increasing from 
BRL 17.1 million (2005) to BRL 52.0 million (2012). The commercial revenues also presented a 
relevant increase from BRL 7.3 million to BRL 21.3 million during the period, followed by match 
day income, moving from BRL 10.1 million to BRL 23.5 million.
In the case of Internacional, Figure 3 indicates that the growth achieved in the period, 
additional BRL 207.5 million, came from all sources of revenues. Broadcasting led the increase, 
with a BRL 74.2 million improvement. Player transfers followed with additional BRL 62.7 million. 
Match day comes next with extra BRL 41.4 million (fans membership included). Commercial 
revenues accounted an expansion of BRL 29.2 million. In general terms, the live event business 
(stadium-based revenues and broadcasting) kept stable at 55% share of the total annual income, 
while commercial and player transfers businesses responded by the remaining 45% of the 
revenues. These figures suggest that the growth effort was distributed throughout the organization. 
Source: Cruzeiro annual reports.
Note: The financial statements started discriminating revenues by source of origin in 2005.
Figure 2. Evolution of Cruzeiro revenues, 2005-2012.
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Source: Internacional annual reports.
Note: The financial statements started discriminating revenues by source of origin in 2005.
Figure 3. Evolution of Internacional’s revenues, 2005-2012.
Commercial business, however, reduced its share, from 25% to 16%, in comparison with player 
transfers, which increased from 20% (2005) to 28% of revenues in 2012.
The comparison of the revenues evolution between the clubs emphasizes that while Cruzeiro, 
through its positioning strategy (PORTER, 1980, 1991), subdued the club to the market conditions, 
the approach of exploiting its resource-capability combinations (WERNERFELT, 1984; BARNEY, 
1991) from Internacional has produced greater benefits allowing the club to outperform the market’s 
growth.
STRUCTURE
Cruzeiro and Internacional have simplified their organizational structures through 
professionalization. At Cruzeiro, a statutory reform at the end of the 90s reduced the number of 
vice-presidencies from eight to two and redistributed the other positions among directors and 
superintendents. Internacional reduced the number of vice-presidencies from ten to four. In both 
cases, the changes concentrated the power in the hands of fewer people to improve decision-making 
efficiency and to reduce potential political conflicts. Table 1 lists the presidents that led the clubs 
and developed their strategies during the period under study.
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Table 1. List of presidents and periods of mandates.
Cruzeiro Mandate Internacional Mandate
Zezé Perrella 1995-2002
Alvimar Perrella 2003-2008 Fernando Carvalho 2003-2006
Zezé Perrella 2009-2011 Vitório Pirffero 2007-2010
Gilvan Tavares 2012 Giovanni Luigi 2011-2014
Source: Cruzeiro and Internacional annual reports.
Cruzeiro and Internacional implemented their organizational adjustments to professionalize 
their structure by adopting some common actions:  1) the redesign of the middle line to accommodate 
salaried and fully dedicated professionals organized into functional departments in replacement of 
volunteer workers;  2) the increase of staff at the operational core to incorporate new functions; 
3) the use of  electronic data systems  to favor the integration and coordination of activities with 
productivity improvement; 4) the replacement of volunteer consultants by contracted ones; 5) 
the centralization of the club’s structure, increasing the vertical specialization (Internacional) or 
keeping it high (Cruzeiro). Appendices 1 and 2 present the evolution of their hierarchy.
Cruzeiro created a counseling board of directors to integrate its middle line with the initial 
objective to improve the interaction between different areas and inform the president about the 
operation of the club. However, it was reported that the informal relationship with the president 
prevented such integration to be more effective. The physical separation between the club’s 
headquarters and the training centers was a concern that contributed to the use of electronic 
data systems, such as ERP (Electronic Resource Planning) and EDM (Electronic Document 
Management). The horizontal specialization increased.
At Internacional, the new middle line arrangement gave priority to areas that generated 
revenue or were indispensable to the football activity. The quality department took the role of 
formalizing the club’s internal processes. The horizontal specialization decreased. The General 
Assembly, formally composed by all club’s members, grew significantly and dispersed the power 
of the club to a greater number of persons. The club’s marketing department was empowered 
obtaining status and stability under the management of the same executive director during the 
whole period of analysis. The club’s representatives consider the increase of fans membership 
achieved through this department as a sign of Internacional’s democratization.
These organizational changes suggest that the early 2000’s market context produced a misfit 
of both clubs’ structures and contingencies (DONALDSON, 1999), affecting their performances. 
Cruzeiro’s reaction indicates a focus on internal processes towards their efficiency improvement, as 
exemplified by the implementation of an ERP and the concern with the communication between the 
departments and the president. Internacional, by its turn, seems to have prioritized the deployment 
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of its resources and capabilities, including its supporters’ loyalty through marketing initiatives, to 
achieve a superior growth (WERNERFELT, 1984; BARNEY, 1991).
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
Cruzeiro
The structural changes implemented by Cruzeiro were the result of the entrepreneurial approach 
of its presidents. Despite the lack of formalization of the decisions that triggered these changes, the 
interviews showed that the political cohesion in the Political Council and the satisfaction of fans 
with the titles conquered by the club legitimized these presidents’ resolutions. Its organizational 
complexity increased and became more bureaucratic. The intervention of volunteer (political) 
leaders decreased in the Board of Directors, showing that rational processes began to prevail over 
political power. In the middle line, the creation of fully integrated functional departments with 
staffs of salaried specialized professionals, promoted greater coordination and control of the club’s 
operating core, allowing the directors to be expeditious and more stable in their support to the vice-
presidency of Football. In addition, the club’s decision-making process gained efficiency with the 
elimination of political positions on several areas of the club.
The entrepreneurial profile of skilled negotiators of the Perrella brothers seems to have 
outlined the role of the presidency and other departments. The consequence of such approach 
was an increased dependence on the club’s playing results, therefore conditioning the scope of its 
managerial practice.
 Internacional
Mr. Carvalho and his successor, Mr. Piffero, formulated a strategy contemplating the long-term 
objectives to overcome the club’s financial difficulties and increase its competitiveness to achieve 
stability. Strategy implementation implied relevant changes in the club’s structure. Even though 
some modifications would replicate solutions typically found in profit-oriented organizations, 
the club’s executive management refused such model based on the assumption that preserving 
the club’s identity was mandatory to its development. Moreover, there were statutory and fiscal 
constraints that required innovative solutions to overcome informality from volunteer work, to 
empower fewer vice-presidents, to formalize the remuneration of upper management and their staff 
without breaking the nonprofit regulation of football clubs. Internacional’s organization gained 
complexity with specialized teams, fully dedicated salaried professionals in key-areas, and formal 
processes. Besides involving the entire organization in the strategy formulation, the respondents 
emphasized that the engagement of the DC was necessary to guarantee its implementation and 
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to assure its continuity. They said that it was a self-preservation maneuver. For them, it was 
something indispensable to improve the club’s competitiveness, especially against bigger Brazilian 
competitors from the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Regardless of the positive results 
achieved between 2003 and 2010, the management believed that complementary structural changes 
were necessary for functional improvement.
The professionalization of Internacional redesigned the relationship between the club’s 
political and technical areas. Politics was restricted to the DC as much as possible. The management 
improved its decision-making efficiency and its organizational control through a modified structure 
composed by a leaner vice-presidency and fully dedicated staff of professionals working in 
accordance to integrated and rational processes with increased productivity.
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND STRATEGY PRACTICE
The 1990s had a different influence in the objectives and actions adopted by Cruzeiro and 
Internacional in the following decade. Cruzeiro conquered 17 different championships during those 
years, including the Libertadores Cup, the 2003 Brazilian cup and the national championship. 
Internacional, by its turn, won only four state championships and one Brazilian cup. In 1999 and in 
2002, the club was very close to relegation to the second division. Therefore, in the beginning of 
the 2000s, Cruzeiro counted on the political support from its DC and fans. Internacional faced the 
opposite situation, the dissatisfaction of its DC and supporters.
Professionalization at Cruzeiro aimed the political consolidation of its president’s group, the 
improvement of management control and sports competitiveness. At Internacional, its objective was 
to overcome financial difficulties, improve the club’s competitiveness and reduce its vulnerability 
to periodic political changes.
Both clubs, due to football statutory constraints, needed mediation between their political and 
technical spheres. Their different contexts contributed to distinct approaches regarding this issue. 
Cruzeiro’s president, Mr. José Perrella, chose to centralize the mediation of political and technical 
spheres and to personify the agreements regarding the club’s strategy. With the approval provided 
by a good sportive performance, political support and a stable financial situation during his term of 
office, the president stood as the foundation around which the club conceived and implemented its 
strategy. The Perrella brothers embodied the visionary leader, which is typical of the Entrepreneurial 
Scholl described by Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (2005). At Internacional, Mr. Carvalho 
chose to formalize the agreements between the political and technical spheres through the strategy 
formulation and its implementation, which contemplated the professionalization process. A major 
change of direction by the club was necessary to gain competitiveness and to achieve stability. 
His approach was to do it through a straight and decentralized way, requiring prior and formal 
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involvement of directors, political and social members, and professionals from different areas. The 
involvement of the entire executive management, various departments and the DC was permanent 
in order to adjust the strategy and its implementation as the long-term plan unfolded, which 
characterized the configuration strategy model (MINTZBERG, AHLSTRAND, LAMPEL, 2005).
Cruzeiro and Internacional made similar structural changes due to professionalization. Both 
clubs reduced the number of political positions on the executive management to concentrate power, 
reduce conflicts and increase the decision-making efficiency. At the middle line, they hired fully 
dedicated professionals in key areas, leaving less relevant activities to volunteers and political 
positions. There was a division of work, increasing the degree of organizational coordination and 
integration. The formalization of jobs and processes, in accordance to the professionalization 
concept proposed by Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) and Dowling et al. (2014), improved the overall 
management control of clubs’ activities.
COMPETITIVENESS
Sporting performance
Sporting success is the major goal of most Brazilian football clubs, instead of profit. 
Winning championships and the coveted cup has an important impact upon the fans and the 
media, enhancing the club’s brand value. Table 2 shows the ranking of Brazilian teams according 
to the quantity of football cups conquered between 2003 and 2012.  Cruzeiro and Internacional 
are ranked third and first place, respectively. The ranking does not take into account any relative 
importance that international, national and regional cups might have before the eyes of football 
stakeholders. When comparing their performances, some aspects regarding their sporting strategies 
are worth mentioning. Both clubs give emphasis to regional championships, where their fan base is 
concentrated. Cruzeiro won six out of twelve cups competed and Internacional won seven.
Outside their home states, Cruzeiro seems to prioritize national championships whereas 
Internacional seems to give preference to the international tournaments. From its eight cups, 
Cruzeiro won two of them in national competitions. Internacional won seven of its fourteen cups 
in international competitions. The year of 2003 was remarkable for Cruzeiro, when it won the state 
cup, Brazil’s cup and the Brazilian Championship. Internacional had 2006 as its best year, winning 
the Libertadores and the Fifa World Club cups.
When comparing the performance of both teams in the Brazilian Championship, it becomes 
apparent that similar quantities of victories may lead to different final league positions. Figures 4 
and 5 show the performance of the clubs in terms of goals scored, quantity of wins and the final 
league position.
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Source: graph adapted from Kase et al. (2006), statistics from Bola na Área (2015).
Figure 4. Sports performance of Cruzeiro in the Brazilian Championship, 2003-2012.
Source: graph adapted from Kase et al. (2006), statistics from Bola na Área (2015).
Figure 5. Sports performance of Internacional in the Brazilian Championship, 2003-2012
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From 2003 to 2012, Cruzeiro and Internacional competed in 400 matches each in the Brazilian 
Championship. Cruzeiro scored 634 goals, 13% above the 560 goals scored by Internacional. Even 
with this favorable statistics, Cruzeiro won 181 times, a 45% success ratio, versus 171 wins by 
Internacional, a 44% success ratio. In terms of average final position, Cruzeiro got the seventh 
rank against the sixth position by Internacional.  The best year for Cruzeiro was 2003, with a 67% 
win ratio and the first final positon; the worst was 2011, with 29% wins and the 16th final position. 
Internacional had its best year in 2005, presenting a 55% win ratio; 2007 was the worst year, when 
it achieved an 11th final position with a 39% win ratio.
Financial performance
The financial strength of football club allows them to hire successful players and to develop 
home-grown talent through youth development schools. Figure 1 shows a period rich in opportunities 
for growth. The 20 biggest clubs in the country jumped their total revenue from BRL 652 million to 
BRL 3.1 billion (+378%). Figure 6 compares the performance of Cruzeiro and Internacional to the 
evolution of this group’s turnover. Cruzeiro grew 130% during the period; Internacional, +959%. 
By taking the 20 biggest clubs as reference, Cruzeiro underperformed its competitors by 52%, 
while Internacional outperformed them by 122%.
Source: Cruzeiro and Internacional’s annual reports; Somoggi (2015).
Figure 6. Growth of football revenues, 2003-2012.
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From June-2010 until February-2013, the “Mineirão” stadium was closed for renovation 
works for the 2014 Fifa World Cup and Cruzeiro had to transfer its local matches to a smaller 
stadium located 70 km away from Belo Horizonte. This fact might explain part of the lack of 
growth of its revenues between 2010 and 2012. However, the performance of Internacional’s 
revenues since 2003 suggests that the club had an advantage over its competitors.
The sports performance of both clubs gives another hint of their strategic approach and 
corresponding outcomes. Cruzeiro’s goals scored were 13% higher than Internacional’s and its 
win ratio was slightly better, 45% against 44%. Despite these statistics, Internacional showed a 
revenue growth 4.6 times higher than Cruzeiro along the period (959% vs. 130%). Based on that, 
we may infer that while Cruzeiro followed the market practices, looking for differentiation through 
playing success (PORTER, 1980, 1991), Internacional produced instead a higher value from its 
resources through innovative initiatives that were not imitated by its competitors in the short term, 
achieving a better fit between the entire club’s organization and its environment (DONALDSON, 
1999; WERNERFELT, 1984; BARNEY, 1991, 1995).
Allegiance resources
In 2004, Mr. Fernando Carvalho reformulated Internacional’s strategic planning to prepare 
the club for its 100th anniversary in 2009. Among the various long-term objectives that were 
set, the increase of alternative revenues was a priority under the responsibility of the Marketing 
department. Figure 7 presents the evolution of fan membership, both in quantity and in revenue. 
When comparing this flow of money with Figure 5, it becomes apparent that this sort of cash 
flow is not influenced by the club’s performance on the field. Cruzeiro’s membership (not plotted 
in Fig. 7), according to the information available, had 7,000 fans in 2008 (PLACAR, 2008) and 
41,152 fans in 2012 (BARBOSA, 2013).
Maximization of playing success under no breakeven constraint
Football clubs in Brazil are nonprofit legal entities operating with the objective of maximizing 
playing success and no formal external constraints to achieve breakeven results. This context leads 
to an escalation of financial debts, past due taxes and social charges. Table 3 presents a summary of 
the income statements of Cruzeiro and Internacional for the year of 2012 and the 2003-2012 period.
Cruzeiro’s gross revenues reached BRL 120.4 million in 2012, 130% above 2003 revenues 
(fig. 1; fig. 6), but with a net loss of BRL 31 million. When comparing the year with the cumulative 
football costs, it is apparent that football costs are increasing above revenue growth (87% of year’s 
net revenue vs. 77% accumulated costs).  Administrative and commercial expenses, 23% both in 
2012 and in the 2003-2012 period, suggests that the club is not gaining any scale benefit from its 
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Source: Internacional internal reports, 2003-2009; Barbosa (2013); Silveira; Cardoso (2014).
Figure 7. Evolution of revenues and quantities of fan memberships, 2003-2012.
Cruzeiro Internacional









Gross Revenue 120.4 108% 903.7 107% 252.9 122% 1,298.9 113%
Net Revenue 111.3 100% 846.2 100% 206.9 100% 1,151.2 100%
Football costs -97.2 -87% -650.9 -77% -159.7 -77% -895.6 -78%
Social & Amateur Sports -9.8 -9% -54.3 -6% 0.0 0% -1.2 0%
Adm&Com expenses -25.2 -23% -198.5 -23% -29.0 -14% -196.0 -17%
Financial Expenses -10.2 -9% -46.1 -5% -7.2 -3% -79.3 -7%
Non operating results 0.0 0% 16.7 2% 0.0 0% 3.1 0%
Profit/loss -31.0 -28% -86.8 -10% 11.0 5% -17.9 -2%
Depreciation/amortization 2.1 2% 33.2 4% 19.6 9% 116.2 10%
EBITDA -18.7 -17% -25.2 -3% 37.8 18% 174.5 15%
Table 3. Income statement summary, Cruzeiro and Internacional, 2003-2012.
Source: Cruzeiro and Internacional’s annual reports.
EBITDA: earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
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revenues growth. Regarding the financial expenses, they reached 9% of 2012 revenues vs. 5% 
cumulative, with a clear growth trend.
Internacional’s similar analysis show opposite trends: 2012 costs and expenses are relatively 
lower than the totals for the period; football costs, 77% vs 78%; administrative and commercial 
expenses, 14% vs 17%, a three percentage points of scale gain; financial expenses, 3% vs 7%, 4 
percentage points lower. Accordingly, the year net result was a BRL 11 million surplus (profit).
In 2012, Cruzeiro’s loss represented 28% of its turnover while Internacional surplus (profit) 
reached 5%. In a long-term perspective, Cruzeiro shows a 10% business loss while Internacional’s 
loss is 2%. However, the comparison of both club’s EBITDAs show that similar sportive 
performances might generate different financial outcomes. As EBITDA refers to the earnings before 
interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization, it measures the business capacity to generate cash to 
pay its operational commitments and make new investments. Between 2003 and 2012, Cruzeiro’s 
EBITDA presented a BRL 25.2 million deficit while Internacional’s presented a BRL 174.5 million 
surplus, representing a BRL 200 million difference.
For a better understanding of the outcomes of these differences, Table 4 shows the evolution 
of the clubs’ indebtedness. It shows the debts and bank financing figures, renegotiated past due 
social charges and taxes, at the end of the years of 2003 and 2012.
Both clubs have increasing debts with banks, Cruzeiro jumping from BRL 5 million (2003) to 
BRL 45.5 million (2012); Internacional, increasing from BRL 9.6 million to BRL 36.8 million. The 
clubs also increased their debts with the government (Past due social charges & taxes). Cruzeiro 










Loans and bank financing 5.0 45.5 40.5 802% 9.6 36.8 27.2 283%
Past due Social charges & Taxes 54.5 78.7 24.2 44% 76.0 121.1 45.1 59%
Total debt BRL Million 59.6 124.2 64.6 108% 85.6 157.9 72.3 84%
Anticipated & Future revenues 15.8 163.0 147.2 932% 3.7 - -3.7 -100%
Total indebtedness 75.4 287.2 211.8 281% 89.3 157.9 68.6 77%
Annual Net Revenues BRL Million 50.8 111.3 60.6 119% 23.9 206.9 183.0 766%
Total debt vs. Net Revenues
Months of
14 11 - 3 43 8 -35.4
Activity
Indebtedness vs. Net Revenues
Months of
18 31 13 45 9 -35.7
Activity
Source: Cruzeiro and Internacional’s annual reports.
BBR, Braz. Bus. Rev. (Engl. ed., Online),
Vitória, BBR Special Issue, p. 67-93, 2017
www.bbronline.com.br
Management is not a Game: The Effects of Strategy and Structural Changes
in the Competitiveness of Football Clubs87
moved from BRL 54.5 million to BRL 78.7 million, while Internacional went from BRL 76 million 
to BRL 121.1 million.
 An interesting measure to evaluate the club’s financial performance is to convert the total 
debts in a ratio corresponding to the number of months of club’s activity necessary to cover the 
debts at the beginning and at the end of the period. Cruzeiro, for example, needed 14 months of 
income to cover its debts in 2003, and reduced it to 11 months in 2012. Internacional, reduced its 
needs from 43 months of revenues in 2003 to 8 months in 2012. Another point worth mentioning is 
the accounting of anticipated and future revenues registered by Cruzeiro. These amounts grew from 
BRL 15.8 million (2003) to BRL 163.0 million (2012), suggesting that the club might be generating 
cash by anticipating money from broadcasting rights. Adding this sum to the total debt, Cruzeiro 
would have increased its needs to cover total indebtedness from 18 months of revenue (2003) to 
31 months or 2.5 years (2012).
CONCLUSION
Brazilian football clubs face unprecedented changes and opportunities with globalization, the 
arrival of new technologies and the imposition of new rules by the local government. During the 
past two decades, management professionalization was and still is a mantra used by football fans 
and professionals to express their vision on how to improve football practices. Revenue increase 
is referred to as the panacea for enhancing sports competitiveness and overcoming clubs’ financial 
difficulties. This article sheds light on how the clubs are dealing with these challenges and to which 
extent strategy, structure and professionalization are being used to their benefit.
The clubs investigated have the same product, equivalent markets, fan bases and sports 
performance. The longitudinal study suggests that even though both clubs have adopted similar 
professionalization and organizational changes to boost their revenues, they differed in strategy and 
the way they have strategized. The configuration approach from Internacional’s strategy produced 
a better structure-contingency fit, leading its revenues to outperform the 20 biggest clubs by 122% 
during the 10 year period investigated. On the other hand, the study suggests that the entrepreneurial 
style adopted by Cruzeiro’s presidents in their strategy practice might have provoked a mismatch 
between the structure and its environment, making the club underperform the market by 52%. 
The outcome was a difference of BRL 200 million in EBITDA generation, favoring Internacional 
in comparison to Cruzeiro, with 6 extra cups, approximately 10% less goals scored and a slightly 
lower win ratio. Consequently, Internacional reduced the revenue period required to cover its 
debts from 3.6 years to eight months while Cruzeiro reduced it from 14 to 11 months, with the 
anticipation of broadcasting rights and future revenues jumping from four months to 1.5 year. 
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The comparison of clubs’ sportive and financial performance with the 20 biggest Brazilian clubs 
suggests that Internacional succeeded in developing a sustained competitive advantage between 
2006 and 2010, with a relevant contribution from its marketing department. Meanwhile, Cruzeiro’s 
underperformance against the market led to estimated losses of at least BRL 60 million income 
during the period of analysis. One common point disclosed by the analysis, however, is that after 
this ten-year period both clubs might have to consider that the time has come for pivoting and 
changing strategy directions. Cruzeiro may confront its past playing achievements with the loss of 
money and debt increase to take a decision on how to proceed. Internacional, in turn, may take into 
account that competitors, jeopardizing its competitive advantage and its future sporting success, 
have finally succeeded in imitating its innovative marketing practices.
As suggested by Barney (1995), the cases of these two clubs confirm that investigating 
sports strategy implementation should not be done separately from a club’s content of strategy 
or its competitive context. It also shows that professionalization and structure changes are highly 
dependent on strategy formulation and the strategizing process to become effective responses to 
organizational contingencies.
The choices of Cruzeiro and Internacional had positive effects on them during the past 
decade. By comparing their performances, this study highlights the impact of their strategy and 
structural changes, advancing the empirical knowledge about the long-term consequences of the win 
maximization strategy with self-imposed (or not) break-even constraints in clubs’ competitiveness. 
If we agree with the idea that playing success in a football club depends on teamwork, the study 
emphasizes that it should extrapolate the pitch lines to reach the boundaries of the entire football 
team organization to achieve sustainable sporting success. It raises additional evidence that the 
investigation of clubs’ financial efficiency as well as the role of boards in clubs’ strategy and 
governance will be beneficial to the development of the sport. Further research on clubs’ annual 
reports content is recommended to improve their quality and transparency. Finally, the development 
of similar studies extending the scope to additional relevant clubs is needed to assist Brazilian 
football in overcoming its current financial crisis. After all, management is not a game and strategy 
in sports does matter.
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Appendix 1. Evolution of Cruzeiro’s organizational structure.
Source: Cruzeiro internal reports.
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Appendix 2. Evolution of Internacional’s organizational structure.
Source: Internacional internal reports.
